Investigating the Role of Cognitive Biases as a Risk Factor for Depression by Dickson, Daniel Aaron
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Dissertations Theses and Dissertations
2015
Investigating the Role of Cognitive Biases as a Risk
Factor for Depression
Daniel Aaron Dickson
Loyola University Chicago
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 2015 Daniel Aaron Dickson
Recommended Citation
Dickson, Daniel Aaron, "Investigating the Role of Cognitive Biases as a Risk Factor for Depression" (2015). Dissertations. Paper 1471.
http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/1471
 
 
 
 
 
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO 
 
INVESTIGATING THE ROLE OF COGNITIVE BIASES AS  
A RISK FACTOR FOR DEPRESSION 
 
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO 
 
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 
 
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
PROGRAM IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
BY 
DANIEL A. DICKSON 
CHICAGO, IL 
MAY, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by Daniel A. Dickson, 2015 
All rights reserved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 I am immeasurably grateful for the support, guidance, and hard work of Dr. 
Rebecca Silton throughout every stage of this project. Without your care and devotion, 
this entire project would not have been completed. This project also benefited from the 
incredibly thoughtful, constructive feedback of Dr. Robin Nusslock, Dr. Scott Leon, and 
Dr. Fred Bryant. I would also like to thank Devin Carey, Catherine Lee, Alisha Miller, 
Edna Romero, Lea Travers, and Mandy Ward for their support throughout graduate 
school. Finally, I would like to thank Kate Van Camp, my family, and the Van Camp 
family for their love and support throughout this process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS        iii 
 
LIST OF TABLES         vi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES         vii 
 
ABSTRACT          viii 
 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION         1 
   Negative Cognitive Schemas and Cognitive Biases in Depression     2 
   Attentional Biases in Depression         7 
   Memory Biases in Depression         9 
   Interpretation Biases in Depression       14 
   Primary Aims and Hypotheses       16 
      Aim 1          17 
      Hypothesis 1a         17 
      Hypothesis 1b         17 
      Hypothesis 1c         17 
      Aim 2          17 
      Hypothesis 2         18 
 
CHAPTER II: METHOD        20 
   Participants          20 
   Procedure          21 
      Study recruitment         21 
   Behavioral Measures        23 
      Dot Probe (DP) Task         24 
         Stimuli          24 
         Design          25 
         Procedure and instructions       26 
      Think/No-Think Task (TNT)       26 
         Word pairs         26 
         Learning phase I        27 
         Leaning phase II        27 
         Testing          28 
         Free recall         29 
         Final recall         29 
      Scrambled Sentences Test (SST)       30 
         Cognitive load         30 
   Self-Report Measures        31 
      Current depression symptoms       31 
      NEO-FFI-R         31 
 
 
v 
 
   Semi-Structured Clinical Interview  Measure     32 
      Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI)    32 
 
CHAPTER III: RESULTS        33 
   Self-Report Measures        33 
   Hypothesis 1a         35 
      Data reduction         35 
      Results          36 
   Hypothesis 1b         37 
   Hypothesis 1c         39 
   Hypothesis 2         40 
   Post Hoc Model         44 
      Post hoc hypothesis        44 
 
CHAPTER IV: DISCUSSION       47 
   Overview          47 
   Attentional Biases         48 
   Memory Biases         50 
   Interpretation Biases        52 
   Combined Cognitive Bias Hypothesis      55 
   Limitations          57 
   Implications for the Understanding and Treatment of Depression   58 
   Future Research Directions        60 
   Conclusions          61 
 
REFERENCE LIST         62 
  
VITA           77 
  
 
 
vi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1. Means (SD in parentheses) for self-report measures and      
  experimental tasks as a function of depression group      34 
 
Table 2. Two-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) results for the      
  Dot Probe Task          37 
 
Table 3. Two-way mixed ANOVA results for the Think-No Think Task    39 
 
Table 4. Two-way mixed ANOVA results for the Scrambled Sentences Test   40 
 
Table 5. Standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients for the     
  three-way interaction of attention, memory, and interpretation biases  
  predicting current depression symptoms        46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. The development of cognitive schema.         2 
 
Figure 2. Beck’s Schema Model depicting the influence of cognitive schema      
    on cognitive biases.            3 
Figure 3. Latent variable CFA model of a biased cognitive style controlling for     
   current depression symptoms.         19 
 
Figure 4. Recruitment and final sample.         21 
 
Figure 5. Dot probe presentation paradigm        25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Consistent with the combined cognitive bias hypothesis (Hirsch, Clark, & 
Mathews, 2006), cognitive biases in attention, memory, and interpretation have been 
posited as an underlying vulnerability to the maintenance and recurrence of depressive 
episodes. While research supports the presence of these biases during current depressive 
episodes, there is limited evidence that these biases persist following the remission of 
depression symptoms. However, there is some initial data that suggest that these biases 
persist in remitted depressed individuals, indicating that these biases may serve as a 
vulnerability factor for subsequent depressive episodes. In addition, there is little research 
that has evaluated these biases in remitted depressed individuals to identify whether these 
biases are explained by a common negatively biased cognitive style that serves as the 
vulnerability factor for subsequent depression symptoms. The broad objective of this 
study was to evaluate cognitive biases across attention, memory, and interpretation using 
experimental measures (i.e. think/no-think paradigm, dot probe, and scrambled sentences 
test) in a remitted depressed and never depressed sample. Overall, the results suggest that 
only interpretation biases may persist following the remission of depression symptoms. 
There was limited support for ongoing processing biases in attention and memory in the 
remitted depression group. Implications for further research and clinical treatment are 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 Major depression is one of the most common psychological disorders (Goodwin, 
Jacobi, Bittner, & Wittchen, 2006). In the United States, 17% of adults experience at least 
one major depressive episode (MDE) during their life (Kessler et al., 2005). Depression 
symptoms are associated with life impairments including interpersonal relationship strain, 
increased likelihood of divorce, and decreased physical well-being (Druss, Hwang, 
Petukhova, Sampson, Wang, & Kessler, 2009; Lewinsohn, Rohde, Seeley, Klein, & 
Gotlib, 2003; Kessler, Akiskal et al., 2006). Additionally, depression symptoms are 
linked to increased likelihood of work burnout and poor work performance. In the United 
States, depression-related loss in work productivity has been estimated to exceed $36 
billion due to either excessive absenteeism, or reduced performance in the workplace 
(Kessler, Akiskal et al., 2006).  
 The significant cost associated with depression is likely related to the recurrence 
of depression symptoms: 85% of people who recover from a Major Depressive Episode 
(MDE) will experience another episode (Keller & Boland, 1998). In addition, each 
successive depressive episode increases the likelihood of recurrence (Boland & Keller, 
2009; Kessing, Hansen, Andersen, & Angst, 2004; Mueller et al., 1999). Treatment 
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outcomes for depression suggest that even after the completion of therapy, 54% of 
individuals relapse within two years following treatment (Vittengl, Clark, Dunn, & 
Jarrett, 2007). Based on these data, depression is currently a highly intractable disorder 
with a high rate of recurrence and relapse and it appears that present treatment methods 
are not curative. Translational research that strives to develop a better understanding 
about factors that contribute to ongoing symptoms and relapse is urgently needed to 
develop treatments that are curative.  
Negative Cognitive Schemas and Cognitive Biases in Depression 
 Beck (1979, 2008) proposed that depression develops as a function of cognitive 
schemas, which are conceptualized as stable mental representations that organize 
knowledge about the self, the world, and the future. Beck theorized that cognitive 
schemas are shaped from early childhood experiences, reinforced over time, and often 
persist throughout the lifespan (see Figure 1). These cognitive schemas represent negative 
beliefs about failure, worthlessness, and loss, and they are activated by negative life 
events. 
 
Figure 1. The development of cognitive schema. 
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Cognitive schemas are thought to bias attention, memory, and interpretation by 
processing data in a “schema-congruent” manner (see Figure 2). For example, an 
individual with a negative schema of interpersonal failure may interpret neutral 
interpersonal cues such as facial expressions and body language as signs of rejection or 
disapproval (interpretation biases) and may experience difficulty directing attention away 
from these cues (attentional biases). The heightened awareness of these stimuli may lead 
to increased elaboration of this information in working memory and activate memories of 
past interpersonal rejection, which enhances negative memories and the strength of the 
schema (memory biases).  
 
Figure 2. Beck’s Schema Model depicting the influence of cognitive schema on cognitive 
biases.  
 
Beck (2008) and Beevers (2005) proposed that these cognitive biases function as 
automatic processes that involve quick, involuntary responses. These automatic processes 
function as a “pattern completion” mechanism that completes patterns of associations 
between the current stimulus and previously recorded stimuli (Beevers, 2005; Smith & 
DeCoster, 1999). Beevers (2005) proposed that this process occurs at a preconscious 
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level where individuals are aware of only the output, such as the experience of a thought 
“popping” into mind or the triggering of negative affective responses (e.g., sadness). In 
contrast to automatic processes, Beevers (2005) theorized that a reflective processing 
system functions as a slow and effortful process aimed to alleviate the negative effects of 
the automatic processes (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). The reflective process is demanding 
on cognitive resources, as this process acts as a series of steps consisting of deliberate 
processes such as executive functions, problem solving, or reappraisal, in order to 
mitigate the negative biases and automatic thoughts to repair depressed mood (Beevers, 
2005). Within the context of mood regulation, using the negative schema of interpersonal 
failure as an example, when a friend calls to meet at a coffee shop to have a “serious 
talk”, the automatic response may activate thoughts of rejection, conflict, and loss. If the 
individual has cognitive resources available, the individual may conjure instances of 
interpersonal success (e.g., “I have many successful friendships”) or reappraisals (e.g., 
“Maybe my friend is having a hard time at work?”) to challenge their initial thoughts of 
rejection and failure to experience relief from the negative automatic processes.  
However, if the reflective process is ineffective in repairing the negative thoughts 
or is unsuccessful in mood repair, the automatic process becomes more salient leading to 
increases in depression symptoms (Beevers, 2005). The reflective process can become 
depleted or ineffective by stressful life events, demands, or distractions, and without the 
intervention of reflective processes, dysphoric mood is proposed to further deplete 
cognitive resources and increase the salience of the cognitive biases (Beevers, 2005). 
Consistent with this theory, Beck (2008) proposed that when these biases are activated 
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through repeated stressful life experiences or a singular severe event, the reflective 
process is compromised and the schemas become organized into a “depressive mode.” 
This depressive mode increases in salience over repeated stressful events or in response 
to a singular event leading to increases in negative appraisals and rumination leading to 
depression symptoms.  
The theories proposed by Beevers (2005) and Beck (2008) are consistent with the 
diathesis stress model of depression, in which biased cognitive styles are posited to be a 
critical diathesis for depression (e.g., Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999; Scher, Ingram, & 
Segal, 2005). Specifically, Beck’s model (1979; 2008), suggests that remitted depressed 
individuals remain vulnerable to subsequent depressive episodes due to the persistence of 
cognitive schemas and cognitive biases following depressive episodes. While some 
previous research suggested that cognitive biases were symptom congruent (e.g., Hollon, 
Kendall, & Lumry, 1986; Lethbridge & Allen, 2008), recent findings suggest that 
cognitive biases persist following depressive episodes (Watkins & Moulds, 2007; 
Wenzlaff & Eisenberg, 2001). Studies that relied on self-report measures of dysfunctional 
attitudes and cognitive biases have indicated that cognitive biases persist in individuals 
with current depression, but not in individuals with remitted depression (Hedlund & 
Rude, 1995; Lethbridge & Allen, 2008; Rude, Covich, Jarrold, Hedlund, & Zenter, 2001; 
Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998). However, on laboratory tasks that measure implicit cognitive 
biases, such as the scrambled sentences test (SST), there is evidence that individuals with 
remitted depression demonstrate biases similar to currently depressed individuals (Gotlib 
& Cane, 1987; Gupta & Kar, 2008; Hedlund & Rude, 2005; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; 
6 
 
 
 
Rude et al., 2001; Wenzlaff & Eisenberg, 2002). It is hypothesized that biased cognitive 
styles are “masked” when individuals are presented with self-report measures through the 
deliberate reflective processes, but are unmasked when implicit measures are utilized, 
which are hypothesized to measure automatic processes such as the previously mentioned 
biased cognitive style (Hedlund & Rude, 1995; Rude et al., 2001; Wenzlaff & Bates, 
1998). 
In summary, cognitive schemas are conceptualized as stable vulnerability factors 
that bias attention, memory, and interpretation and this biased cognitive style functions as 
an automatic process (Beevers, 2005). Outside of the experience of stressful life events, 
conscious, reflective processes modulate biased cognitive styles, essentially “correcting” 
for negative affect (Beevers, 2005). However, when presented with stressful life events, 
cognitive resources become depleted, and the reflective process that previously corrected 
for the biased cognitive style fails leading to depression symptoms (Beck, 1979; 2008; 
Beevers, 2005). The stability and persistence of biased cognitive styles and their 
interaction with stressful life events may be related to the high relapse rate in depression 
(Beck, 2008; Beevers, 2005; Keller & Bolland, 1998). While there is evidence that 
supports the linkage between life stress and subsequent depressive episodes (Lewinsohn, 
Joiner, & Rhode, 2001; Monroe & Harkness, 2005; Seeds & Dozois, 2010), there is 
limited research demonstrating the persistence of biased cognitive styles outside of 
depressive episodes. 
The proposed study was designed to further investigate 1) the persistence of 
biased cognitive styles following depressive episodes, and 2) whether biases in attention, 
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memory, and interpretation are indicators of a common biased cognitive style, such as 
Beck’s proposed cognitive schema, that is indicated after controlling for the influence of 
depression symptoms.  
Attentional Biases in Depression 
A key element of Beck’s schema theory is that individuals with depression 
demonstrate a propensity to overly attend to negative stimuli. According to Beck’s 
theory, schemas guide top down attentional control processes in that these schemas direct 
attentional resources toward negative stimuli (Beck, 2008). Individuals with depression 
demonstrate attentional biases that manifest as difficulties disengaging attention from 
negative stimuli (Bradley, Mogg, & Lee, 1997; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007). For example, 
individuals with depression show enhanced attention for sad faces in comparison to both 
neutral and happy faces and demonstrate difficulty disengaging from sad faces (Joormann 
& Gotlib, 2007; Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven, Franck, & Crombez, 2005). While 
conversely, never depressed individuals demonstrate greater visual attention to happy 
faces and less visual attention toward sad faces (Gupta & Kar, 2008; Joormann & Gotlib, 
2007). Depression has been related to abnormalities in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortical 
regions that are associated with top down attentional control (Silton et al., 2011; Phillips, 
Drevets, Rauch, & Lane, 2003), and these structural and functional abnormalities worsen 
as a function of previous depressive episodes (Vanderhasselt & De Raedt, 2009). In sum, 
research indicates that individuals with depression demonstrate attentional biases for 
negative stimuli that are substantiated by neural mechanisms.  
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 At first blush, initial research on attentional biases in depression yielded 
seemingly inconsistent results with Beck’s cognitive bias theory (MacLeod, Mathews, & 
Tata, 1986; Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 
1997). These early studies borrowed experimental paradigms that were used to 
investigate attentional biases common in anxiety disorders (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007). Individuals with anxiety disorders 
readily orient to threat-related information as these individuals are scanning their 
environment for perceived threat cues (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Studies have shown 
attentional biases to threatening stimuli in anxious individuals using paired stimuli (e.g., 
angry face paired with neutral face) for brief durations (e.g., 250 ms), demonstrate that 
attention is engaged for threatening stimuli under short stimulus durations. These findings 
are consistent with theoretical models of anxiety that propose that anxious individuals 
attend to threat during early, automatic stages of information processing (Bar-Haim et al., 
2007; Mogg, Bradley, De Bono, & Painter, 1997; Williams et al., 1988; 1997). When 
applying the same paradigm to individuals with depression, attentional biases to threat 
information were not observed (Mogg & Bradley, 2005). Supporting these data, Koster, 
De Raedt, Goeleven, Franck, & Crombez (2005) did not find differences in attentional 
biases for negative information under short durations (i.e., 250 ms) in individuals with 
depression. In contrast, attentional biases have been observed in individuals with 
depression when negative stimuli are presented for longer durations (e.g., 500 - 1500 ms; 
Koster et al., 2005), indicating that these biases are not due to hypervigilance, but instead 
indicative of sustained attention with stimuli and difficulties disengaging from stimuli 
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(Koster et al., 2005). Consistent with these findings, these temporal effects were observed 
in individuals with current depression, but not in individuals with generalized or social 
anxiety disorder (Bradley et al., 1997; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 2004; 
Gotlib, Kasch, Traill, Joormann, Arnow, & Johnson, 2004). Taken together, previous 
research has demonstrated an attentional bias to negative stimuli that occurs at a later 
processing stage and appears to be specific to depression.  
  If cognitive biases are indeed stable risk factors, then attentional biases are 
expected to be present in individuals with remitted depression. Using a dot probe 
paradigm with supraliminal presentation rates, Joormann and Gotlib (2007) and 
Fritzsche, et al. (2010) showed that individuals with remitted depression demonstrated a 
bias toward sad faces. While there is initial evidence supporting the persistence of 
attentional biases in individuals with remitted depression, there is little research regarding 
the association of these biases with other aspects of information processing in remitted 
depressed individuals. Additionally, given Beck’s theory that these cognitive biases 
persist as risk factors in the recurrence of depression, a more detailed understanding of 
how these processes interact with other vulnerability factors (e.g., life stress) to predict 
subsequent depression symptoms is necessary.  
Memory Biases in Depression 
Likely related to attentional biases, depression is also associated with significant 
memory problems (Williams, Barnhofer, Crane, Hermans, Raes, & Watkins, 2007). 
Notably, depression is related to a recall bias for negative stimuli, indicating that positive 
stimuli are not readily recalled, while negative stimuli becomes quickly engrained in 
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memory (Moritz, Jacobsen, Willenborg, Jelinek, & Fricke, 2005; Williams et al., 2007). 
Attentional biases likely influence how valenced information is encoded and 
subsequently recalled. Research has shown that depressed individuals who have an 
attentional bias toward negative information demonstrated a greater recall for that 
negative information (Gotlib, Krasnoperova, et al., 2004). Increased elaboration and 
rehearsal of negative information may be influenced by a negative cognitive schema that 
preferentially primes retrieval of negative information. Elaborative processes may 
parallel ruminative processes, in which individuals are exposed to negative life events 
and mood states and they respond by ruminating about the stressor and/or their negative 
mood (Lyuobomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). The 
rumination process may act as a form of mental rehearsal and elaboration that allows for 
greater accessibility and promotes automatic retrieval of these memories, which in turn 
maintains the negative mood state (Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). 
Memory biases for negative stimuli appears to fuel a bi-directional cycle that is difficult 
to break, and as such, studying the interacting roles of attentional and memory biases has 
crucial implications for developing a better understanding about factors that contribute to 
the recurrence and maintenance of depression symptoms. 
 Difficulties inhibiting certain types of information may also promulgate memory 
biases and ruminative thinking processes (Hertel, 1997; Zetsche & Joormann, 2011). In 
particular, individuals with depression report more attempts to suppress unwanted 
memories and more rumination in comparison to individuals without depression 
(Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). These individuals with depression also report more thought 
11 
 
 
 
intrusions related to unhappy memories than happy memories and enhanced recall of 
negative memories (Howell & Conway, 1992; Roemer & Borkovec, 1994; Williams et 
al., 2007). Wenzlaff (2002) proposed that attempts to suppress memories are predictive of 
subsequent rumination, and clinical research studies have shown  significant associations 
between thought suppression and rumination (Watkins & Moulds, 2009). The ability to 
suppress thinking has significant implications not only due to the associations with 
rumination, but also due to the significant associations between the ability to suppress 
thinking and enhanced recall of select negative memories.   
Research evaluating the ability to suppress information, also referred to as 
Retrieval Induced Forgetting (RIF; Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 2000; Anderson, 2003), is 
an area of developing research. RIF is proposed to function as an inhibitory forgetting 
mechanism for unwanted information that is intended to be forgotten, which in turns 
enhances the retrieval of other memories (Anderson & Green, 2001; Anderson, 2003; 
Groome & Sterkaj, 2010). The effects of RIF have been observed as a function of 
“directed forgetting” tasks in which individuals are trained in cue-target (e.g., sandy-
beach) associations and are later presented the cue words (e.g., sandy) and instructed to 
either recall or forget previously learned targets (e.g., beach). In healthy individuals, RIF 
acts as a mechanism through which individuals can inhibit retrieval of “unwanted” or 
“suppressed” items (e.g., to be forgotten items; Anderson & Green, 2001). For example, 
consistent with the theory of RIF in healthy individuals, suppression of the target (e.g., 
beach) following cue presentation (e.g., sandy) will lead to “forgetting” of the association 
of the cue-target (e.g., sandy-beach) in that there is a decreased likelihood of recall over 
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repeated cue presentations (see Anderson & Green, 2001; Hertel & Gerstle, 2003). 
Conversely, previous research indicates that those who are currently depressed 
demonstrate a reduced ability to forget stimuli, as evidenced by enhanced recall for “to be 
forgotten” items in comparison to healthy controls (Cottencin et al., 2008; Groome & 
Sterkaj, 2010; Hertel & Gerstle, 2003; Joormann & Tran, 2009). Taken together, these 
findings highlight the potential association between deficits in forgetting and enhanced 
recall of negative information. 
In addition, there is evidence that following directed forgetting tasks, depressed 
individuals demonstrate biased recall for negatively valenced information (Hertel & 
Gerstle, 2003; Power, Dalgleish, Claudio, Tata, & Kentish, 2000). Using positive and 
negatively valenced words and word pairs, Power et al. (2000) reported that participants 
with depression exhibit increased recall of negatively valenced “to be forgotten” items in 
comparison to healthy controls (Power et al., 2000). In addition, Hertel and Gerstle 
(2003) provide evidence for greater recall of “to be forgotten” items in dysphoric 
participants in comparison to healthy controls and that there was a recall tendency of 
negatively valenced to be forgotten items. Both Power et al. (2000) and Hertel and 
Gerstle (2003) used a self-referential manipulation that was implemented during the 
learning trials of the word list and word pairs such that participants were given 
instructions to encode information in a self-referent manner (e.g., “Imagine yourself 
walking along a sandy beach”). This experimental manipulation differs from other 
directed forgetting tasks that do not overtly instruct participants to encode information in 
a self-referential manner. This self-referential manipulation has significant implications 
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for the encoding and recall of word pairs as Watkins (2002) provides evidence that when 
information is encoded at “perceptual levels” (e.g., non-semantic focused processing), 
implicit memory biases for negative information are not observed. However, when 
information is encoded in a self-referential manner, there is enhanced recall of negative 
information in depressed individuals (Watkins, 2002). Taken together, these findings 
suggest that self-referential encoding is a key element in unmasking the memory biases in 
currently depressed individuals.  
Recent findings suggest that memory biases persist after depressive episodes have 
remitted (Fritzsche et al., 2009; Gupta & Kar, 2008). Compared to healthy controls, 
individuals with remitted depression show enhanced recall for negative words following 
a self-referential encoding task (Fritzsche et al., 2009). In addition, Gupta and Kar (2008) 
showed that both participants with current depression as well as participants with 
remitted depressed generated more specific negative events than positive events in 
comparison to never-depressed individuals, indicating that memory biases persist 
following depressive episodes. While the negative memory bias appears to persist in 
individuals with remitted depression, to date, no research has evaluated the association 
between the inability to forget negative information (e.g., RIF) and free recall biases 
following self-referent coding. RIF deficits may be associated with negative memory 
biases if difficulties suppressing information contributes to the maintenance of negative 
memory biases (Joormann, 2005, 2006; Williams et al., 2007). The proposed study aims 
to detect whether difficulties in forgetting negatively valenced memories persist in the 
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wake of depressive episodes and whether RIF impairments are associated with biased 
recall of negative memories.  
Interpretation Biases in Depression 
 Individuals with depression often interpret neutral or emotionally ambiguous 
stimuli as negative (Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010), and this negative interpretation is 
referred to as an “interpretation bias”. Given the presence of ambiguity in day-to-day 
interactions, negative interpretation biases can significantly contribute to the perception 
of negative interpersonal interactions. For example, an individual with a negative 
interpretation bias may interpret an ambiguous stimulus, such as neutral facial 
expressions, as disapproval (e.g., “the sales person did not smile at me because they do 
not like me”). Interpretation bias may increase vulnerability for negative, self-referential 
thinking that can contribute to depression symptoms (Rude, Wenzlaff, Gibbs, Vane, & 
Whitney, 2002). There is significant evidence for increased levels of negative 
interpretation biases in a range of depressed samples, including individuals with current 
clinical depression and remitted depression (Watkins & Moulds, 2007; Wenzlaff & 
Bates, 1998; Wenzlaff & Eisenberg, 2001). These biases have been observed in 
individuals with depression using both self-report and experimental measures (Cane & 
Gotlib, 1985; Miller & Norman, 1986; Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; Watkins & Moulds, 
2007). These biases demonstrate that depression is associated with a depressive “filter” 
through which individuals with depression interpret ambiguous information. 
Interpretive biases appear to persist following the remission of depression 
symptoms (Rude, Covich, Jarrold, Hedlund, & Zentner, 2001; Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998; 
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Wenzlaff & Eisenberg, 2001). In a study by Wenzlaff and Eisenberg (2001), currently 
depressed, remitted depressed, and never depressed individuals were presented with 
audio recording of homophones with emotional alternatives to depression (e.g., 
mourning/morning). Participants were tested using two separate instructions, one group 
was asked to write down the spelling of the homophone immediately after the target word 
was presented and the other group was instructed to delay responses for 10 seconds. The 
researchers found that in the delay condition, participants with remitted depression and 
healthy controls generated significantly fewer negative homophones in comparison to 
participants with current depression. However, in the immediate response condition, 
participants in the currently and remitted depressed groups generated significantly more 
negative homophones in comparison to the never depressed group. These findings 
indicate that when tasks require an immediate response, interpretation bias persists in 
remitted depressed individuals. Wenzlaff & Eisenberg (2001) and Wenzlaff & Bates 
(1998) propose that in the delayed response condition, effortful processes, such as 
reappraisal or distraction are implemented to modulate negative responses. This is in 
contrast to the immediate response condition in which the researchers propose that these 
effortful processes fail to amend negative responses. Together, these data indicate that 
negative interpretation biases persist following depressive episodes, but these biases are 
only revealed under conditions in which deliberate modulating processes are not 
activated.  
Related, there is further evidence of persistent negative thinking in individuals 
with remitted depression under conditions of cognitive load. In a study by Watkins & 
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Moulds (2007), the researchers used the scrambled sentence paradigm to assess for 
differences in sentence completion. Participants were presented with six scrambled words 
(e.g., “the future dismal very bright looks”) and asked to rearrange the text into a 
sentence omitting one word. The researchers found that participants with currently 
depression formed significantly more negative sentences in comparison to participants in 
the remitted depressed and never depressed groups. However, during a working memory 
condition (i.e., asked to recall a six-digit number while completing the task), the 
researchers found that the responses for the participants in the remitted depressed group 
were more similar to the responses for the participants in the currently depressed group as 
measured by an increase in negatively themed sentences. Taken together, these findings 
indicate that negative interpretation biases can be masked or modulated by a top-down 
effortful strategy, but when cognitive resources are taxed, negative interpretation bias 
surfaces for individuals with remitted depression, indicating that interpretation biases 
persist following depressive episodes.  
Primary Aims and Hypotheses 
The present study aims to close a gap in the cognitive bias literature by 
identifying a common cognitive bias style that is associated with attentional, memory, 
and interpretation biases. The literature supports specific elements (attention, memory, 
and interpretation) of this cognitive style, suggesting that these biases may represent a 
cognitive vulnerability to depression as postulated by Beck’s cognitive schema theory. 
Moreover, while cognitive models of depression postulate that biases in attention, 
memory, and interpretation interact with life stress leading to the recurrence of 
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depression symptoms, there has been little research evaluating the interaction of this 
effect. More importantly, to date, no study has evaluated the interaction of this biased 
cognitive style with life stress within individuals with remitted depression to predict 
subsequent depression symptoms. 
Aim 1. The present study evaluated the persistence of cognitive biases (attention, 
memory, and interpretation) in individuals with remitted depression. This is the first 
study to evaluate all three biases in a remitted depressed sample.   
Hypothesis 1a. Participants in the Remitted Depressed (RD) group will 
demonstrate an attentional bias for negative stimuli on an implicit attention (dot-probe) 
task in comparison to participants in the never depressed (ND) group.  
Hypothesis 1b. Participants in the RD group will show greater recall of “to be 
suppressed” items in comparison to participants in the ND group on a Retrieval Induced 
Forgetting (RIF) task. Specifically, it is predicted that in comparison to the ND group, the 
RD group will have enhanced free recall of negatively valenced items following directed 
forgetting instructions, indicating biased recall of negative information. 
Hypothesis 1c. It is expected that the RD group will show a negative 
interpretation bias, as indicated by the proportion of negatively valenced sentences 
completed in the Scrambled Sentences Test, in comparison to the ND group. 
Aim 2. As stated previously, the combined cognitive bias hypothesis proposes 
that biases in attention, memory, and interpretation are due to a shared underlying 
process. However, to date, no research has tested this hypothesis as studies have typically 
evaluated these processing biases in isolation. The present study extends upon the extant 
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literature by testing the proposed association between these biases using a confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) approach.   
Hypothesis 2. To test the proposed model that biases in attention, memory, and 
interpretation are due to a common processing style as proposed of the combined 
cognitive bias hypothesis, a CFA model was tested. In this model, the number of 
negatively valenced word pairs freely recalled following the think/no think task (TNT), 
the attentional bias score from the dot probe (DP), and the proportion of negatively 
valenced sentences formulated during the scrambled sentences test (SST), will be used as 
indicators of a latent variable, referred to as a biased cognitive style. In this model, each 
of the experimental indicators will be regressed on depression symptoms (measured by 
the PHQ-9), to account for the influence of depression symptoms on task performance 
(see Figure 3). By accounting for the influence of depression symptoms on each indicator 
in the present model, the resulting dependent variables (the indicators) will be residuals in 
that they have accounted for the influence of depression symptoms on the individual task 
performance. It is plausible depression symptoms may account for a significant 
proportion of variance in task performance, but it is hypothesized that the cognitive style 
latent variable will account for task performance for each indicator above and beyond the 
influence of depression symptoms. If the proposed cognitive style is indicated, this would 
suggest that the processing style persists independently of depression symptoms, 
providing evidence of the persistence of the negative cognitive biases that functions 
independently of depression symptoms. 
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Figure 3. Latent variable CFA model of a biased cognitive style controlling for current 
depression symptoms.  
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were right-handed, native English speaking males and females who 
were recruited from a university-based participant registry maintained by our lab. 
Participants were required to meet the following criteria that are typically used in 
cognitive neuroscience studies: right handedness, native English speaker, no vision 
problems, and no history of neurological disorders. The Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
approved all aspects of this study.  
A total of 73 participants were recruited to participate in the study. Of those 
participants, 61 completed the diagnostic interview. However, three participants declined 
to complete the laboratory tasks yielding 58 participants who completed the diagnostic 
interview and experimental tasks. Of the 58 participants, nine were lost due to corrupted 
or missing data files yielding 49 individuals with complete laboratory data available. 
However, an additional two participants were identified as statistical outliers with scores 
on the experimental and self-report measures as indicated by greater than four standard 
deviations from the group mean, five participants were missing self-report data, and four 
participants were currently depressed, yielding 38 participants (see Figure 4). The final 
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sample consisted of 25 females (68.4%) and 13 males (31.6%) with a mean age of 20.26 
(SD = 1.30) ranging from 18 to 24. With regard to ethnicity, 57.9% identified as
Caucasian (n = 22), 23.7% as Asian American (n = 9), 2.6% as African American (n = 1), 
13.2% as biracial (n = 5), and 2.6% declined to state (n = 1).  
 
Figure 4. Recruitment and final sample. 
Procedure 
Study recruitment. The proposed study employed a high-risk paradigm to 
identify individuals with current and lifetime history of depression. Participants were 
invited to undergo screening for the proposed study if they meet any of the following 
criteria (available via participant registry): 1) current depression symptoms as evidenced 
by the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9; Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001) score 
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of greater than ten 2) no current depression symptoms as defined by a PHQ-9 score of 
less than five, but a history of depression symptoms as indicated by endorsement of the 
Mood Depression Questionnaire (MDQ; Watson, Clark, et al., 1995) item that inquires 
about history of depressive episodes 3) no current depression symptoms as defined by a 
PHQ-9 score of less than five without a history of depressive episodes (per the MDQ). 
The cutoffs were determined from validity work conducted on the PHQ-9 in primary care 
settings (Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001). The MDQ is the gold standard 
questionnaire measure for indexing past depressive episodes (Williams, Van der Does, 
Barnhofer, Crane, & Segal, 2008).  
Prior to enrollment in the proposed study, participants were screened to determine 
whether they meet DSM-IV criteria for 1) current depression 2) lifetime history of 
depression (but not current) or 3) no history of depression. Screening was conducted in 
an in person interview using the MINI International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI; 
Sheehan, Lecrubier, Sheehan, Amorim, Janavs, Weiler et al., 1998) to assess for current 
and lifetime diagnoses for anxiety and mood disorders. Psychological treatment history 
(i.e., current/past psychotropic medication or psychological treatment), and neurological 
history were also collected during screening. Interviewers were advanced doctoral 
students who were trained and supervised by Rebecca Silton, Ph.D. Accuracy of 
diagnosis was reviewed in consensus meetings in order to ensure high inter-rater 
reliability for diagnosis. Participants were included in the remitted depressed (RD) group 
if they reported DSM-IV criteria for a past Major Depressive Episode (MDE), and, 
following the recommended guidelines by the National Institute of Mental Health 
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Collaborative Program on the Psychobiology of Depression (e.g., Keller et al., 1992; 
Joormann & Gotlib, 2007), must report eight consecutive weeks with no more than two 
MDE symptoms. The never depressed (ND) group consisted of individuals who did not 
report current diagnosis or a history of any Axis I disorder. Of the final 38 participants 
included, 17 were identified as remitted depressed (44.7% of sample), and 21 were 
identified as never depressed (55.3% of sample). There were no differences in across the 
two groups in regard to gender, χ2(1) = 1.138, p = .319. In regard to differences between 
groups in regard to age, an independent samples t-test was used. The results of the 
analysis suggest that there were no differences between the two groups in regard to age, 
t(35) = 0.95, p = .348.  
Behavioral Measures 
Following the diagnostic interview, participants were scheduled for a second 
experimental session in which they completed the experimental tasks and self-report 
measures. Three tasks were selected to evaluate cognitive biases in depression: dot probe 
(DP) was used to evaluate attention biases Think/No Think Test (TNT) was used to 
evaluate memory biases, and Scrambled Sentences Test (SST) was used to evaluate 
interpretation biases. In an aim to control for order effects, four counterbalanced 
conditions were created and each participant was randomly assigned to each condition. 
All participants were tested individually in a sound-proof laboratory testing room, seated 
in a comfortable chair, approximately 100 centimeters from a 21-inch CRT monitor. The 
TNT and the DP were implemented using E-Prime Software version 2.0 (Psychology 
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Software Tools, Sharpsburg, PA). The SST was designed for “pencil and paper” 
administration.    
Dot Probe (DP) Task. The DP task is a measure of attentional bias that has 
demonstrated differences in attention for negative stimuli between currently depressed 
and non-depressed samples (Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010). Previous research 
suggests significant differences between currently and remitted depressed individuals in 
comparison to never depressed counterparts (Joormann & Gotlib, 2007). The present task 
is modeled after the work of Joormann and Gotlib (2007), who presented 40 picture pairs 
(20 happy and 20 sad emotions paired with neutral emotional expressions of the same 
actor) for 1,000 ms.  
 Stimuli. Faces expressing happy, sad, and neutral emotions were taken from the 
Karolinska Emotional Directed Faces dataset (KDEF) designed by Lundqvist, Flykt, & 
Öhman (1998) and the final images were selected using ratings from Goeleven, De 
Raedt, Leyman, and Verschuere (2008). The KDEF database consists of 490 (JPEG 
images) displaying faces with emotional expressions (angry, fearful, disgusted, sad, 
happy, surprised, and neutral) from 70 individuals (35 men and 35 women) at five 
different angles. All individuals were between 20 and 30 years of age and were excluded 
if they displayed beards, mustaches, earrings, eyeglasses, and visible make-up. All faces 
were facing front with the hairline removed from the faces to make the actual emotion 
more distinct. Twenty different faces (10 male and 10 female) each with happy, sad, and 
neutral facial expressions and ratings of intensity and arousal from Goeleven, De Raedt, 
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Leyman, and Verschuere (2008) were selected. Each photo was presented in black and 
white.  
Design. Each of the 40 picture pairs (20 happy and 20 sad expressions was paired 
with neutral faces) was presented twice for a total of 80 trials per participant. The order 
of faces and probe placement was randomized for each participant to avoid order effects. 
At the onset of each trial, the participant was presented with a fixation cross for 1,000 ms 
followed by the presentation of an emotionally valenced facial expression (i.e., happy or 
sad) paired with a neutral facial expression of the same actor for 1,000 ms. Directly 
following the presentation of the pictures, a black dot was presented in the place of either 
the neutral or the emotionally valenced photo (see Figure 6 for details). The dot remained 
on the screen until the participant indicates the location of the dot, on the right or the left, 
by pressing one of two response keys on a keyboard (see Figure 6). E-Prime software 
recorded reaction time latency and accuracy. To control for effects of gender and 
emotional valence of each photo, each face appeared in the right and left positions with 
equal probability. In addition, the dot was presented in both positions with equal 
frequency.  
 
Figure 5. Dot probe presentation paradigm. 
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Procedure and Instructions. The task was presented using E-Prime Software to 
control for rates of presentation and record response latencies and accuracy. Each image 
was presented on a 21-inch computer monitor. Each image on the screen was 
approximately 9  10 cm and 13 cm apart. Participants were seated 100 cm from the 
monitor. Each participant was instructed to use the fixation cross to focus his or her 
vision for each task. They were instructed that their task is to identify the placement of a 
dot that could appear on the left or right position on the screen and to respond as fast and 
as accurately as possible by pressing the appropriate key. Participants were provided with 
error messages for incorrect responses. Before testing, 12 practice trials (with neutral-
neutral pairs) were administered.  
Think/No-Think Task (TNT). The TNT is a measure of working memory recall 
in which individuals are instructed to either “think” or “suppress” (i.e., “no think”) a 
previously learned “target” word when presented with a “cue” word. It is proposed that 
this measure is indicative of inhibitory processes in memory. More specifically, as 
previous work indicates a recall bias of negatively valenced word pairs following 
suppression trials in depressed individuals (Power et al., 2000). The procedure for this 
task was adapted from Hertel and Gerstle (2003) and Joormann et al. (2005). Stimuli and 
training phases were adapted from Hertel and Gerstle (2003) and testing was adapted 
from the work of Joormann et al. (2005). The task is broken into four sections: Learning 
Phase I, Learning Phase II, Testing, and Final Recall. 
 Word pairs. Forty nouns were selected from Hertel and Gerstle (2003). All nouns 
were between four and seven letters in length and imageability ratings greater than 5 (on 
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7-point scales from Paivio, Yuille, & Madigan, 1968), emotionality ratings less than 4, 
and ratings of goodness between 3 and 5 (on 7-point scales from Rubin and Friendly, 
1986). Each noun was paired with either positively or negatively valenced adjectives to 
influence the “emotion” of the noun (e.g., “failing” vs. “esteemed” paper). Emotion 
ratings for both positive and negative pairings (on a 9-point scale ranging from extremely 
positive to extremely negative) were used in balancing the sets. Participants were 
exposed to only one of the emotionally valenced adjective-noun pairings (e.g., “esteemed 
paper”).  
 Learning Phase I. Forty study word pairs and ten filler pairs appeared in white 
font, centered on a black computer screen for 5,000 ms. Participants were instructed to 
study the word pairs as they are presented to remember the word pairs for a later test. As 
consistent with Hertel and Gerstle (2003), in an attempt to infuse the personal meaning of 
each word pair, the participants were instructed to create a self-referential mental image 
for each word pair. To gauge the personal relevance of each word pair, participants were 
asked to rate meaningfulness of the image on a scale from 1 (not meaningful at all) to 5 
(very personally meaningful). There was no time limit to reply to the meaningfulness of 
the trials. During initial training, the word pairs appeared in a randomized block order.  
 Learning Phase II. Following Learning Phase I, 50 word pairs (40 study words + 
10 filler pairs) were presented as part of a feedback test in which each participant was 
asked to recall response words out loud. The first word of each pairing was presented in 
black font for 5,000 ms. Immediately following the presentation of the cue word, the 
correct response was presented in blue font for 2,000 ms. Participants were instructed to 
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use the blue words to reinforce their knowledge of the word pair. If participants recalled 
less than 50% of the word pairs, the feedback test was repeated with the cues randomly 
ordered. Participants were given a maximum of four feedback tests to learn the word 
pairs to the 50% criterion to advance to the testing phase. In the present study, all 
participants reached the 50% criterion. In the present study, seven of the 38 participants 
(18.4% of the sample) completed the Learning Phase II more than once, with one of the 
seven participants (2.6% of the sample) needing three attempts in Learning Phase II to 
reach the 50% criterion. The mean percentage of words learned at Training Session II 
was 62.25% of words with a standard deviation of 12.19%. 
 Testing. The main suppression phase (think/no-think) was preceded by practice 
trials for carrying out the study instructions. For each trial, a fixation cross preceded the 
cue word for 200 ms followed by the 4,000 ms presentation of the cue word. Cue words 
were presented in either red or green font, centered on a black background. Participants 
were instructed to avoid saying or thinking about the response words that were paired 
with the cue words appearing in red. For cue words appearing in green, participants were 
instructed to recall the correct responses out loud, just as they had done in Learning Phase 
II. Participants were asked to read and fully comprehend the cue word to stay focused for 
the entire 4,000 ms presentation time. For the red cue words, the instructions emphasized 
the importance of preventing the response word from coming to mind and that they 
should not think about the response word for the duration of the 4,000 ms presentation 
time. If participants mistakenly respond to a red cue word, they were reminded to avoid 
responding to these cue words by the experimenter. 
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 During the practice trials, one filler cue word appeared in red eight times, and six 
filler words appeared in green (once or twice each) for a total of 17 practice trials. The 
testing phase consisted of 240 think/no think trials. The trials appeared in a randomized 
block order with five positive cue words for responding repeated 12 times (60 trials), five 
positive cue words for not responding repeated 12 times (60 trials), five negative cue 
words for responding repeated 12 times (60 trials), and five negative cue words for not 
responding repeated 12 times (60 trials). The remaining 10 positive and 10 negative cue 
words were not presented. These cue words were separated into four categories: five 
positive-suppress, five positive-respond, five negative-suppress, and five negative-
respond. These never presented cue words acted as the baseline in comparison to the 
items used for testing.  
 Free Recall. Directly following the Testing Phase, participants were asked to 
recall the word pairs from the original Learning Phases regardless of task instruction (i.e., 
“think” or “not think”). The number of correctly recalled word pairs was recorded for 
each participant.  
Final Recall. In the Final Recall Phase, participants were administered each of 
the cue words and asked to recall all response words from the learning phase, regardless 
of whether they had responded or suppressed the cue words in the testing phase. Each cue 
word appeared in white font centered on the black background for 4,000 ms. Trial order 
consisted of the filler words followed by each cue word presented in randomized block 
order. The number of correct responses following cue words was recorded for each 
participant.  
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Scrambled Sentences Test (SST). The current study used the 40 scrambled 
sentences used by Rude, Covich, Jarrold, Hedlund, & Zenter (2001) (developed by 
Wenzlaff, 1988, 1993). Each set of words allows for a positive or negative sentence 
construction (e.g., the future looks very bright/dismal). It is proposed that the SST serves 
as measure of interpretation bias, in that depressed and remitted depressed individuals 
formulate more negatively valenced sentences (e.g., the future looks very dismal) in 
comparison to the never depressed group. Sentences were administered using a paper and 
pencil measure in one of three randomly generated presentation orders. Participants were 
instructed to make one statement from the available words, but they were not required to 
use all words presented. The SST was scored by counting the number of positive and 
negative completions consistent with instructions (i.e., grammatically accurate, using five 
words) and dividing each emotional valence total by the total number of responses to 
create a valence proportion score for each condition (i.e., load vs. no load). The 
advantage of using proportions as the index of interpretation bias is that it controls for the 
number of possible statements overall. 
 Cognitive load. Consistent with previous work using the SST (Watkins & 
Moulds, 2007; Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998), the SST was administered in two phases, under 
cognitive load and without cognitive load. In the cognitive load condition, participants 
were asked to retain a six digit number while they complete 20 scrambled sentences. 
Following the load condition, participants were asked to recall the six digit number. In 
the no load condition, participants were instructed to complete 20 scrambled sentences 
without additional instruction. Following Watkins and Moulds (2007) and Wenzlaff and 
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Bates (1998), participants were given four minutes to complete each set of 20 sentences 
(load and no load), and were instructed to work as quickly as possible.  
Self-Report Measures 
Current depression symptoms. To assess for symptom severity, the 22-item 
anhedonic depression scale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire (MASQ-
AD Scale; Watson, Clark, et al., 1995) and the PHQ-9 (Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 
2001) was administered to participants on the day of their laboratory visit. The MASQ-
AD and PHQ-9 have demonstrated acceptable reliability and validity both within clinical 
and non-clinical samples, and are highly correlated (Bredemeier et al., 2010). In the 
present study, both the PHQ-9 (α = .81) and the 22-item MASQ-AD subscale (α = .86) 
demonstrated high internal consistency.  
 NEO-FFI-R. The 60-item NEO Five-Factor Inventory was used to assess for the 
five basic personality factors including neuroticism (N), extraversion (E), openness to 
experience (O), agreeableness (A), and conscientiousness (C; Costa & McCrae, 1989, 
McCrae & Costa, 2004). The 60 items were taken from the larger pool of 180 items from 
the NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI, McCrae & Costa, 1985). The measure has 
demonstrated acceptable to high internal consistency (.68-.86; Costa & McCrae, 1992), 
high test-retest reliability (.86 - .90 across the five scales; Robins, Fraley, Roberts & 
Trzesniewski, 2001) and has been validated across multiple samples including high 
school students and adults (McCrae & Costa, 2004). Each item was scored on a five-point 
Likert response format ranging from “Strongly disagree” (0) to “Strongly agree” (0). In 
the present study, the 12-item neuroticism subscale was used, which included items such 
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“Too often, when things go wrong, I get discouraged and feel like giving up” and reverse 
coded items such as “I am not a worrier”. Within the present sample, the neuroticism 
subscale demonstrated high internal consistency (α = .88). 
Semi-Structured Clinical Interview Measure  
Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI). To assess for 
depression, anxiety, and substance use disorders, the Mini International Neuropsychiatric 
Interview (MINI) was used. The MINI is a standardized diagnostic interview instrument 
that was based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 4
th
 edition (DSM-IV; American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) and ICD-10 (World Health Organization, 1991) criteria 
for axis I disorders. The instrument consists of structured, standardized, close-ended 
questions throughout the interview and current and past diagnoses were made. 
Interviewers included Rebecca Silton, PhD, and advanced master-level graduate students 
with previous experiences in psychotherapy and assessment. Diagnoses were made 
according to the number of items endorsed for each disorder and diagnosis was agreed 
upon by weekly consensus meetings with other trained interviewers. Previous research 
with the MINI suggests that it is a valid and reliable diagnostic tool (Gabarrón et al., 
2002; Lecrubier et al., 1997). 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Self-Report Measures 
To evaluate differences in self-reported depression symptoms, neuroticism, and 
worry between the RD and ND groups, independent samples t-tests were used (see Table 
1 for group means and standard deviations). There were no significant group differences 
on the PHQ-9, t(36) = -1.42, p = .164 or the PSWQ, t(36) = -0.18, p = .856. However, the 
RD group had a significantly higher score on the MASQ-AD, t(36) = -2.32, p = .026, 
indicating that individuals with remitted depression reported greater current anhedonic 
depression symptoms than individuals without a history of depression. Previous research 
suggests blunted responsiveness in reward processing following depressive episodes, 
which may explain the observed differences in anhedonia given the specificity of 
anhedonic symptoms measured by the MASQ-AD (Lethbridge & Allen, 2008; Pechtel, 
Dutra, Goetz, & Pizzagalli, 2013). In addition, the RD group scored significantly higher 
on the NEO-FFI-R neuroticism subscale, t(36) = -2.88, p = .007. The observed significant 
difference in self-reported neuroticism between the two groups is unsurprising as 
previous research has found that neuroticism is related to the development, onset, and 
maintenance of depression symptoms (Clarke, 2004; Farmer, Redman, Harris, Mahmood, 
Sadler, Pickering, & McGuffin, 2002; Nolan, Roberts, & Gotlib, 1998).  
  
 
 
 
Table 1. Means (SD in parentheses) for self-report measures and experimental tasks as a function of depression group. 
 Remitted Depressed Never Depressed 
 (n = 17) (n = 21) 
Age 20.04 (0.96) 20.45 (1.54) 
PHQ-9 Total 6.59 (3.87) 4.67 (4.35) 
MASQ-AD Total 59.94 (12.47) 48.46 (17.02) 
PSWQ Total 56.62 (13.92) 55.85 (12.02) 
NEO-FFI-R Total 20.25 (3.75) 16.86 (4.76) 
Dot Probe: Sad Attention Capture  11.93 (14.66) 10.58 (12.70) 
Dot Probe: Happy Attention Capture 7.84 (14.05) -9.59 (19.35) 
TNT Total Number of Negative Words Learned at Training Phase II 10.29 (2.82) 11.52 (2.38) 
TNT Total Number of Positive Words Learned at Training Phase II 12.44 (3.11) 12.30 (2.64) 
TNT Total Number of Negative Words Recalled at Free Recall 5.12 (2.40) 4.81 (4.14) 
TNT Total Number of Positive Words Recalled at Free Recall 5.47 (2.18) 6.16 (3.71) 
TNT Number of Negative Words Forgotten Between Training and Free Recall 5.18 (2.90) 6.71 (3.62)  
TNT Number of Positive Words Forgotten Between Training and Free Recall 6.97 (2.83) 6.14 (2.78) 
SST Total Negative Sentences Count (Load) 5.82 (5.31) 2.24 (3.16)  
SST Total Negative Sentences Count (No Load) 4.94 (3.85) 2.57 (2.54) 
SST Total Positive Sentences Count (Load) 10.24 (6.01) 13.67 (5.64) 
SST Total Positive Sentences Count (No Load) 11.29 (5.57) 13.90 (3.81) 
SST Proportion Negative Sentences (Load) 37.35 (32.29) 15.78 (21.04) 
SST Proportion Negative Sentences (No Load) 32.78 (24.45) 15.99 (15.62) 
3
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Hypothesis 1a 
 To evaluate attentional biases for sad faces between the RD and ND group, a 
two-way mixed model ANOVA was conducted. In this analysis, RD and ND groups were 
used as the between-subjects factors and emotional face valence (i.e. happy or sad) was 
the within-subjects factor with attentional bias scores as the dependent variable (see 
Table 2). To calculate the attentional bias scores, each score was calculated separately for 
sad and happy faces using the following equation (cf. Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; Mogg et 
al., 1995): Observed attentional bias score = 1/2 [(LpRe – LpLe) + (RpLe – RpRe)]. In 
this equation, R represents the right position, L is the left position, p is the probe, and e is 
the emotional face. For example, LpRe is the mean latency when the probe is in the left 
position and the emotional face is in the right position. As noted in Joormann and Gotlib 
(2007), this equation calculates the “attention capturing” of the emotional faces by taking 
into account mean probe detection times for probes appearing the same position as 
emotional faces from the mean detection times for probes appearing in different positions 
from the emotional faces.  
Data reduction. To minimize the influence of outlier trials, reaction times (RTs) 
that were less than 100 ms were excluded from the analysis since anyone who is 
responding prior to 100 ms is unlikely to be adequately following task instructions. 
Similarly, RTs that were greater than 1,000 ms were excluded from the analyses because 
they were extremely infrequent and were most likely indicative of lapses in 
concentration. Overall, the exclusion of these extreme RTs resulted in the deletion of less 
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than 0.5% of the data and there were no group differences in percentage of outlier trials 
between the two groups, t(36) = 1.26, p = .220. 
Results. The results of the ANOVA showed a significant main effect of face 
emotion, F(1, 36) = 11.85, p = .001, which indicates significant differences in attentional 
bias scores as a function of face emotion. Specifically, across all participants, the data 
suggest greater attention toward sad faces (M = 11.23, SD = 2.22) and attention away 
from happy faces (M = -0.88, SD = 2.81). In addition to the main effect of face emotion, 
there appears to be a significant main effect of group, F(1, 36) = 6.70, p = .014, 
indicating significant differences in attentional bias scores between the RD (M = 9.89, SD 
= 2.70) and ND groups (M = 0.49, SD = 2.43). The RD group demonstrated a greater bias 
for emotionally valenced faces, as opposed to neutral faces, in comparison to the never 
depressed group. Finally, there was a significant interaction effect between group and 
face emotion, F(1, 36) = 5.20, p = .029. Post-hoc contrasts showed that the RD group 
demonstrated a greater attentional bias toward happy faces (M = 7.84, SD = 4.17) in 
comparison to the ND group (M = -9.59, SD = 3.75). The ND group demonstrated 
attentional bias away from happy faces as evident by the negative attentional bias score. 
In addition, contrary to hypothesis 1a, there was not a significant difference in attention 
to sad faces between the RD (M = 11.93, SD = 3.30) and ND groups (M = 10.58, SD = 
2.97). While no differences were observed between the two groups, both groups 
demonstrated biases toward sad faces suggesting sad faces were attention capturing for 
both groups. This is contrary to previous findings that show that individuals without a 
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history of depression demonstrate attention away from sad faces (Joormann & Gotlib, 
2007). 
Table 2. Two-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) results for the Dot Probe Task. 
Source SS df MS F p 𝜂𝑝
2 Observed 
Power 
        
Diagnostic 
Group 
1658.47 1 1658.47  8.17 .014 .157 .712 
Face 
Valence  
2765.34 1 2765.34 11.85 .001 .248 .918 
Group x 
Valence  
1213.79 1 1213.79  5.20 .029 .126 .603 
Error 8397.87 36 233.27     
        
 
Hypothesis 1b 
 A two way mixed model ANOVA was run to evaluate the predicted differences 
between the RD and ND groups on ability to suppress negatively valenced stimuli as 
measured by the Think/No-Think (TNT) task. In this model, group was the between-
subjects factor and word pair valence was the within-subjects factor (i.e. positive and 
negative; see Table 3). The dependent variable in this analysis was calculated for each 
word pair valence by subtracting the number of words recalled during the Free Recall 
session from the number of words learned as measured in Training Session 2. The 
observed values were the number of words pairs forgotten as a function of the Testing 
Phase (i.e. think/no-think trials) with more positive values suggesting greater forgetting. 
It was expected that if deficits in forgetting for negative stimuli were present, the 
observed score for negatively valenced pairs would be a significantly less for the RD 
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group in comparison to the ND group, suggesting a greater recall of negative word pairs 
following directed forgetting.  
To test for baseline differences in learning word pairs following Training Session 
2, two separate independent samples t-tests were run. In these models, the number of 
word pairs learned was compared between the two groups. These comparisons were 
made separately for each emotional valence to determine baseline differences in word 
pair learning by valence. As expected, there were no significant differences in negatively 
valenced word pairs learned between the two groups, t(36) = 1.46, p = .154, and no 
significant differences in positively valenced word pairs learned between the two groups,  
t(36) = -0.15, p = .883. These results suggest that there were no differences in encoding 
between the two groups as a function of emotional valence, which rules out potential 
differences in forgetting material due to simple differences in word pair learning.  
The results of two-way mixed ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of 
word valence, F(1, 36) = 7.57, p = .009, suggesting significant differences in the number 
of words freely recalled between the positive (M = 6.52, SD = 3.32) and negative 
valences (M = 4.97, SD = 3.59). More specifically, there was an overall greater rate of 
forgetting for positively valenced word pairs in comparison to positive word pairs. The 
main effect for group was not significant, F(1, 36) = 0.36, p = .554, indicating no 
differences in rates of forgetting between the two groups regardless of word valence. 
Finally, in contrast to hypothesis 1b, the interaction of group by word pair valence was 
not statistically significant, F(1, 36) = 0.15, p = .700, suggesting there were no 
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differences in the number of word pairs freely recalled as a function of group and word 
pair valence.  
Table 3. Two-way mixed ANOVA results for the Think-No Think Task. 
Source SS df MS F p 𝜂𝑝
2 Observed 
Power 
        
Diagnostic 
Group 
6.53 1 6.53 0.36 .554 .010 .089 
Word Pair 
Valence  
46.25 1 46.25 7.57 .009 .174 .764 
Group x 
Valence  
0.92 1 0.92 0.15 .700 .004 .067 
Error 219.83 36 6.11     
        
 
Hypothesis 1c  
A two way mixed model ANOVA was used to test the hypothesis that participants 
with remitted depression would show an interpretation bias favoring negative information 
(as measured by the Scrambled Sentence Test; SST). In this model, the between-subjects 
factor was diagnostic group with condition (i.e. “load” and no “load”) as the within-
subjects factor, and the dependent variable was the proportion of negative sentences 
completed (see Table 4).  
Overall, there was no main effect of condition, F(1, 36) = 0.82, p = .371, 
suggesting no differences in number of sentences completed as a function of the load and 
no load conditions. However, a significant main effect for group was observed, F(1, 36) = 
6.90, p = .013, indicating that remitted depressed individuals completed a greater 
proportion of negative statements (M = 35.06, SD = 27.67), in comparison to never 
depressed individuals (M = 15.72, SD = 17.13). Finally, in contrast to predictions, there 
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was no significant interaction effect of diagnostic group by load condition, F (1, 36) = 
0.98, p = .328, suggesting no differences between the two groups as a function of load 
condition.  
Table 4. Two-way mixed ANOVA results for the Scrambled Sentences Test. 
Source SS df MS F p 𝜂𝑝
2 Observed 
Power 
        
Diagnostic 
Group 
6912.04 1 6912.03 6.90 .013 .161 .725 
Load Condition 89.49 1 89.49 0.820 .371 .022 .143 
Group x 
Condition 
107.15 1 107.15 0.982 .328 .027 .162 
Error 3928.23 36 109.12     
        
 
Hypothesis 2 
To test the hypothesized model that cognitive biases (attention, memory, and 
interpretation) observed in depression are due to a common processing bias across 
participants (i.e., the combined cognitive bias hypothesis), a confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) model was tested. In this model, three observed scores were used as indicators in 
the model: attentional bias score for sad faces as measured by the Dot Probe task, 
memory bias score measured by the TNT, and interpretation bias score measured by 
Scrambled Sentences Test. The attention bias score was the observed score from the Dot 
Probe task. The memory bias score was calculated by determining the count of negatively 
valenced word pairs freely recalled following the “no think” instructions. This ratio score 
was computed by calculating the sum of the negatively valenced word pairs recalled 
followed by dividing that sum by the total of all word pairs recalled following the Testing 
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Phase. The final indicator in the model, the interpretation bias score was the proportion of 
negatively valenced sentences in the “cognitive load” condition. This proportion was 
computed by calculating the sum of negatively valenced sentences and dividing the sum 
by the total number of sentences completed in the “cognitive load” condition. In the final 
model, each indicator was converted to a z score by subtracting the mean from each score 
and dividing by the standard deviation to allow for ease of interpretation of intercepts and 
mean values. Additionally, the factor loading from the latent variable to each indicator 
was allowed to be freely estimated, while the variance of the latent factor was fixed at 
1.00 to allow for identification of the latent variable (Kline, 2011). Finally, to account for 
the influence of current depression symptoms for the results of each task performance, 
each indicator will be regressed on current depression symptoms measured by the PHQ-
9. To evaluate the fit of the model, five measures were used. The χ2 test was calculated to 
determine if the proposed covariance matrix deviates significantly from the observed 
covariance matrix of measured variables with a nonsignificant χ2 value indicating 
acceptable fit. To evaluate the incremental fit of the model, the Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI; Bentler, 1990) and the Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) was used with scores closer to 
1.00 indicating improved fit. Present recommendations indicate that both CFI and TLI 
values should be ≥ .95 to indicate a well-fitting model (Hu & Bentler, 1999). In addition, 
residual based indices, which can be conceptualized as “badness of fit” indices, were 
used to evaluate the discrepancy between observed and predicted covariances. In the 
present model, the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990) 
and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) were used to evaluate fit with 
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observations closer to zero indicating improved model fit with RMSEA cut-off values 
close to .06 and SRMR values less than .05 indicating acceptable model fit (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999). 
The results of the proposed confirmatory factor analysis suggest significant ill fit 
to the data as indicated by the presence of an illogical value, referred to as a Heywood 
case (Heywood, 1931). A Heywood case occurs in factor analysis models when the 
model converges to specific variance values that are less than a lower bound value or 
greater than the upper bound value (e.g. correlations greater than 1), which are indicative 
of significant flaws in model specification (Kolenikov & Bollen, 2012). In this model, the 
Heywood case was indicated by the residual variance of the interpretation bias indicator, 
which was a negative value (θ = -2.27, SE = 20.97, p = .914) and is a highly illogical 
value. Causes of Heywood cases can include issues with specification (e.g., fixing a non-
zero factor loading to zero), non-identification of the model, the presence of outliers, 
small sample sizes (e.g., N < 100), poor start values, few structural constraints (e.g., a 
more saturated model the estimates almost all possible paths) or extremely high or low 
population correlations (Chen, Bollen, Paxton, Curran, & Kirby, 2001). In the present 
case, it appears that the present Heywood case may be due to the low sample size (N = 
38) and few structural constraints. Heywood cases may possibly be addressed for the 
residual variances in CFA models by instituting equality constraints across the estimated 
residual variances for each indicator provided that the original model converges with the 
unrestricted parameter (i.e. model converges with Heywood case estimated; Chen et al., 
2001, Gerbing & Anderson, 1987). To test for a more valid model without the presence 
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of a Heywood case, the present model was re-specified by instituting equality constraints 
for each of the residual variances for each latent factor indicator using the residual 
variance for interpretation bias as the referent value.  
The results of the re-specified confirmatory factor analysis indicated an overall 
acceptable fit of the model, χ2(2) = 1.60, p = .450. In addition, the incremental fit indices 
(CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.14) and residual based indices (RMSEA = .000; Probability 
RMSEA <= .05 = .301; SRMR = .043) suggest excellent fit to the data. While the overall 
model suggests an excellent fit to the data, the interpretation of these results should be 
presented with caution. First, while the factor loadings for memory, λ = 0.58, SE = 0.20, 
p = .003, and attentional bias λ = -0.45, SE = 0.21, p = .034, were significant, the factor 
loading for interpretation bias was not statistically significant, λ = 0.30, SE = 0.22, p = 
.168, suggesting that the latent variable explains a non-significant proportion of variance 
in interpretation bias. Additionally, the proportion of variance explained by the latent 
variable for attentional and interpretation bias scores, 9% and 20% respectively, was 
significantly below the desired cutoff of 𝑅𝑠𝑚𝑐
2 > .50 (Kline, 2011). These results suggest 
that while the model is appropriately fitting the shared variance amongst the three 
indicators is not indicative of the proposed latent processing bias factor. Interestingly, 
upon review of the influence of depression symptoms on each of the indicators, it appears 
that current depression symptoms significantly predicted interpretation bias scores, b = 
0.09, SE = 0.04, p = .011, but did not have a significant effect on memory or attentional 
biases. Interpreted in conjunction with the significant bivariate correlation between 
interpretation bias and current depression symptoms (r = .37, p = .021), this finding 
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indicates that interpretation biases may not function independent of mood states as 
initially proposed. More specifically, given that current depression symptoms explain a 
significant proportion of variance in interpretation bias scores this may indicate that 
interpretation biases may be more influenced by mood state rather than an enduring, trait-
like depression processing bias. In sum, the proposed hypothesis that each bias indicator 
is related to a shared, underlying cognitive processing bias was not supported by the data.  
Post Hoc Model 
Post hoc hypothesis. Given the limited evidence in support of the cognitive 
processing bias, an alternative post hoc analysis was conducted. An alternative 
explanation may be that each bias uniquely contributes to depression symptoms, and that 
depression symptoms may be particularly exacerbated if the processing biases work in 
concert.  
To test this hypothesis, the standardized attention, memory, and interpretation 
bias scores were used. The inclusive plan for analyses was based on Aiken and West’s 
(1991) guidelines for using multiple regression to test moderation hypotheses. First, the 
continuous variables in the analyses were centered to create interaction terms for each of 
the independent variables (Aiken & West, 1991). Each two-way interaction effects were 
computed by multiplying the task scores in a pairwise fashion (e.g. attention bias x 
memory bias). Then, to create the three-way interaction, the centered attention, memory, 
and interpretation bias scores were multiplied to create a three-way interaction term.  To 
test the three-way interaction, hierarchical simultaneous regression was used in SPSS 
version 22. In this analysis, each predictor was entered into the regression equation 
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hierarchically with the main effects entered into the model first, followed by the two-way 
interactions, and finally the three-way interaction predicting depression symptoms. This 
approach allows for evaluation of the change in the proportion of variance explained as a 
function of predictors (i.e. R
2
 and adjusted R
2
). The results of this model are presented in 
Table 5. Overall, the results of the model show that the three-way interaction did not 
significantly predict depression symptoms, b= -2.33, SE= 2.41, p = .343. Additionally, 
the two-way interactions did not significantly predict depression symptoms at the p < .05 
level. Interpretation biases was the only significant predict depression symptoms, b = 
5.13, SE= 2.40, p = .040 suggesting that interpretation biases predict current depression 
symptoms above and beyond attention and memory biases.   
 
 
 
   
Table 5. Standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients for the three-way interaction of attention, memory, and 
interpretation biases predicting current depression symptoms. 
 Step 1: Main Effects Step 2: Two-way Interactions Step 3: Three-way Interactions 
Predictor β b 
(SE) 
p β b 
(SE) 
p β b 
(SE) 
p 
Intercept  5.53 
(0.64) 
<.001  5.55 
(0.73) 
<.001  5.59 
(0.73) 
<.001 
TNT: Proportion of 
Negative Word 
Pairs Recalled 
0.04 1.34 
(6.53) 
.838 0.04 1.34 
(6.53) 
.838 0.02 0.76 
(6.57) 
.908 
SST: Proportion of 
Negative Sentences 
Completed (Load 
Condition) 
0.35 5.13 
(2.40) 
.040 0.36 5.33 
(2.86) 
.072 0.34 4.95 
(2.89) 
.097 
DP: Attentional 
Bias for Sad Faces 
0.23 0.07 
(0.05) 
.171 0.20 0.06 
(0.05) 
.252 0.26 0.08 
(0.06) 
.170 
TNT x DP    -0.05 -0.13 
(0.41) 
.764 -0.05 -0.13 
(0.41) 
.755 
TNT x SST    -0.04 -4.62 
(23.68) 
.847 -0.07 -8.26 
(24.00) 
.733 
DP x SST    -0.11 -0.16 
(0.24) 
.519 0.01 0.02 
(0.30) 
.948 
TNT x SST x DP       0.01 -2.33 
(2.41) 
.343 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
Overview 
Negative biases in attention, interpretation, and memory, referred to as the 
combined cognitive bias hypothesis (Everaert, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012; Hirsch, Clark, 
& Mathews, 2006), are posited as the critical mechanisms that contribute to the onset, 
maintenance, and recurrence of depression. While many studies have identified cognitive 
biases in depressed samples, relatively few studies have evaluated these biases following 
the remission of depression. The purpose of the current study was to expand upon 
previous research by examining the persistence of biases in attention, memory, and 
interpretation in individuals with a history of depression and to evaluate the shared 
associations amongst these cognitive constructs, as proposed by the combined cognitive 
bias hypothesis. Overall, the results of the present study provide limited support of the 
combined cognitive bias hypothesis. Contrary to expectations, there were no differences 
in attentional or memory biases between the remitted depressed and never depressed 
groups, which did not lend support to the combined cognitive bias hypothesis in regard to 
attention and memory. However, the present findings indicate interpretation biases persist 
following depression remission suggesting that these biases may be either a static 
vulnerability factor or a “mental scar” related to a lifetime history of depression. Finally, 
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the proposed common negative processing bias and the conditional effect of each 
processing bias predicting depression symptoms were not supported by the data.  
Attentional Biases 
Both groups (RD and ND) showed an attentional bias toward sad faces. This is in 
contrast to previous research, which shows that individuals without a history of 
depression demonstrated greater attentional capture away from sad faces in favor of more 
neutral expressions compared to currently depressed and remitted depressed participants 
(Joormann & Gotlib, 2007). It is plausible that greater orientation toward sad faces was 
observed due to a general attention negativity bias (Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 
1998; Taylor, 1991). Previous research indicates that negative information, even when 
controlled for by arousal ratings, is found to be more salient and associated with greater 
orientation in comparison to more positively valenced information, which would explain 
the lack of observed differences between the two groups in regard to sad faces 
(Schimmack & Derryberry, 2005; Vuilleumier, 2005).  
Significant differences for attention for happy faces were observed between the 
two groups. Unexpectedly, individuals with remitted depression demonstrated a bias 
toward happy faces, while individuals without a history of depression attended away 
from happy faces in favor of neutral expressions. The differences in attentional bias in 
regard to happy faces may suggest that remitted depressed individuals may have 
naturalistically begun to demonstrate greater engagement for positively valenced stimuli, 
which previous research suggests contributes to mood repair (Sanchez, Vazquez, Marker, 
LeMoult, & Joormann, 2013). This is supported by cognitive bias modification 
49 
 
 
 
interventions that indicate that negative mood may be improved and inoculated against as 
a function of attentional bias retraining toward positive stimuli and away from neutral 
stimuli in individuals with depression (Baert, De Raedt, Schacht, & Koster, 2010; 
Browning, Holmes, Charles, Cowen, & Harmer, 2012; Yang, Ding, Dai, Peng, & Zhang, 
2014). In essence, the observed differences may be due to a naturalistic shift in attention 
to positive stimuli, which may have contributed to symptom remission or may have 
protected against depression recurrence.  
Alternatively, it cannot be ruled out that the lack of support for attentional biases 
for negative stimuli may be due to the lack of “activation” of these biases by negative 
mood states. Previous findings in the area of affective priming posit that negative biases 
are dormant until activated by negative mood states, either naturalistically in the 
environment through life stress or experimentally using a negative mood induction (Segal 
& Ingram, 1994). Therefore the lack of significant findings may be due to the limited 
activation of the negative mood state. However, given previous evidence for attentional 
biases without negative mood induction procedures (Joormann & Gotlib, 2007), more 
research may be needed to better understand the influence of negative moods states on 
activating attentional biases in individuals with remitted depression.  
In addition, it is plausible that the lack of observed effects may be due to a well-
healed “mental scar” in individuals with remitted depression. For example, Baert, De 
Raedt, & Koster (2009) found that using a spatial cueing task, sustained attention for 
negative stimuli was positively correlated with symptom severity within a sample of 
moderate to severely depressed, mild depressed, and healthy individuals. This suggests 
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that attentional bias may function as a co-occurring symptom of depression severity as 
opposed to a vulnerability factor. Therefore, it may be possible that the previously 
observed biases may have been due to residual depression symptoms as opposed to an 
underlying processing bias that functions independently of mood states.  
Contrary to expectations, the results indicated that individuals without a history of 
depression experience greater attention capture toward neutral faces when presented with 
both neutral and happy faces in the same trial. This finding was expected to be observed 
within the remitted depressed group as previous findings suggest individuals with a 
history of depression demonstrate biases away from happy stimuli in favor of neutral 
stimuli (Baert, De Raedt, Schacht, & Koster, 2010; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007). The bias 
away from happy faces in the never depressed sample is in contrast to multiple studies 
that reported greater attentional capture for happy stimuli for never depressed individuals 
(Ellis, Beevers, & Wells, 2011; Gotlib & Krasnoperova, 1998; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; 
Sears, Thomas, LeHuquet, & Johnson, 2010). While individuals with remitted depression 
may demonstrate greater attention away from positive stimuli, the impact of this 
attentional bias may be attenuated by an additional third variable, such as effective mood 
regulation strategies or positive appraisals. In essence, it is plausible that while attention 
is captured, it is the interpretation of these faces that contributes to negative mood states 
(Everaert, Tierens, Uzieblo, & Koster, 2013; Yoon & Zinbarg, 2008).   
Memory Biases 
 Individuals with a lifetime history of depression were predicted to demonstrate an 
inability to suppress and therefore forget negative information, which could possibly 
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explain the observed effects of enhanced memory for negative information. However, the 
present results did not reveal group differences in forgetting between negative and 
positive emotional valenced information following a directed forgetting task. The main 
effect of differential forgetting between the positive and negative valenced information 
was not anticipated as multiple studies suggest that healthy samples demonstrate an 
improved ability to forget information for both positive and negatively valenced words. 
The finding from the current study suggests that negatively valenced word pairs were less 
likely to be forgotten, suggesting enhanced recall in comparison to positively valenced 
word pairs in both groups.   
Previous research has found that difficulties in forgetting negative information are 
present within samples of currently depressed individuals, and it was proposed that the 
inability to forget negative information as a function of directed forgetting would persist 
following depressive episodes (Hertel & Gerstle, 2003; Power et al., 2000). However, 
given the lack of support for deficits in forgetting in individuals with remitted depression, 
it may be plausible that individuals with a lifetime history of depression, but are not 
currently depressed have developed emotion regulation strategies that may mitigate the 
impact of negative stimuli on mood. As such, Joormann, Hertel, LeMoult, & Gotlib 
(2009), found that following a directed forgetting task, individuals with MDD who were 
trained to substitute negative and positive words to use as new words when instructed to 
“forget” targets demonstrated greater forgetting of previously learned word pairs. These 
findings suggest that depressed individuals may learn effective means to interrupt 
elaborative processes of negative memories, which may have contributed to improved 
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mood in the remitted depressed sample and may protect against the development of 
future depression symptoms.  
The limited evidence for persistent attentional and memory biases in the current 
study may be explained from the perspectives of the priming hypothesis (Segal & 
Ingram, 1994), which postulates that triggering depressive mood states through mood 
induction procedures “activates” negative cognitive schema. This is corroborated by 
studies that demonstrate significantly larger effects following negative mood induction 
procedures (Clasen, Wells, Ellis, & Beevers, 2013; Wener-Seidler & Moulds, 2012) as 
opposed to without mood inductions (for review, see Mathews & MacLeod, 2004). 
Furthermore, the participants in the current study may have benefited from manipulation 
checks regarding self-reference for word pair encoding (Wisco, 2009; Wisco & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2010). More specifically, Wisco (2009) proposes that self-reference (e.g. “my 
failing paper”) as opposed to externally relevant stimuli (e.g. “my friend’s failing paper”) 
is important in revealing negatively biased thinking.  
Interpretation Biases 
 Consistent with predictions, individuals with a history of depression completed 
more negative sentences in comparison to the never depressed group suggesting 
differences in negative interpretation biases between the two groups. However, contrary 
to hypotheses, this effect was observed in both the load and no load conditions. This is in 
contrast to previous research that indicates negative thinking is regulated by effortful 
control strategies, such as thought suppression, that may mask negative thinking in the 
wake of depression remission. Previous research showed that when demands were placed 
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on effortful control strategies via cognitive load manipulations (e.g., mental rehearsal of a 
six digit number), negative interpretations were “revealed” (Hedlund & Rude, 1995; 
Moulds & Watkins, 2007; Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998; Wenzlaff & Eisenberg, 2001). In the 
current study, the negative interpretation bias observed in the remitted depressed group 
indicated that negative interpretations are still active following depression, and cognitive 
models of depression suggests that this tendency toward a negative interpretation bias 
may act as a vulnerability to depression recurrence. In addition, the post hoc analyses 
show that interpretation bias was the only significant predictor of concurrent depression 
symptoms among the processing biases. While unexpected, the present findings are in 
line with previous research that found interpretation biases are predictive of symptom 
recurrence after controlling for baseline depression and depression history (Rude, 
Wenzlaff, Gibbs, Vane, & Whitney, 2002). However, future research should evaluate the 
interaction of these biases with life stress, which is proposed to activate the influence of 
these biases on negative mood states on subsequent depression symptoms as such 
findings would be consistent with the cognitive model of depression.  
 It should be noted that the observed interpretation bias is consistent with various 
cognitive models of depression. It is unclear if the observed biases are due to residual 
depressive thinking, consistent with the “scar” hypothesis (Lewinsohn, Steinmetz, 
Larson, & Franklin, 1981), or due to a vulnerability factor that functions independent of 
depressive mood states. Due to the lack of longitudinal data and the presence of 
depression histories in the current sample, it is not possible to harness the data from the 
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current study to determine a causal relationship between depression and interpretation 
biases.  
While the present study is limited in regard to testing causal associations between 
interpretation biases and depression, the current findings further highlight the role of 
interpretation biases on depressogenic processes. As previously stated, interpretation 
biases have been observed within both individuals with current depression and those with 
a history of depression (Hindash & Amir, 2012; Hedlund & Rude, 1995). In addition, the 
presence of interpretation biases is predictive of increases in depression symptoms over 
time (Rude et al., 2002). Given the evidence that interpretation biases have implications 
for the persistence and recurrence of negative mood states, there has been a growing 
interest in the manipulation of interpretation biases using cognitive bias modification 
(CBM) paradigms. For example, Blackwell & Holmes (2010) and Bowler et al. (2012) 
provide evidence of significant mood improvement following sessions of CBM for 
interpretation biases. Furthermore, Bowler et al. (2012) demonstrate changes in 
interpretation biases, as captured by the Scrambled Sentences Test, as a function of CBM 
indicating that change in interpretation may have therapeutic effects on mood. This is 
further supported by Hallion & Ruscio (2011), who conducted a meta-analysis evaluating 
CBM paradigms for both anxiety and depression that targeted interpretation and 
attentional biases, which found that CBM interventions for interpretation demonstrated 
the largest effect on processing biases in comparison to attentional bias modification 
paradigms. Furthermore, recent findings suggest that interventions targeting 
interpretation biases can manipulate maladaptive appraisals regarding depressive, which 
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may have implications for a “vaccine” against the negative intrusive memories (Lang, 
Moulds, & Holmes, 2010). Taken together, the present evidence in conjunction with the 
extant literature show the integral role interpretation biases may play in the onset, 
maintenance, treatment, and prevention of depression symptoms.  
Combined Cognitive Bias Hypothesis 
The present study evaluated whether a shared common processing bias accounts 
for the theorized co-occurrence of attention, memory, and interpretation biases in 
individuals with depression. Contrary to study hypotheses, the results did not support this 
model as the proposed confirmatory factor analysis model did not adequately fit to the 
data. In the current study, a post hoc regression analysis was implemented to test the 
effect of a three-way interaction of each processing biases was tested to determine if the 
impact of biases in attention, memory, and interpretation on current depression symptoms 
is conditional on the presence of each processing bias. The interactions tested in this 
model were not significant. The failure to support the combined cognitive bias hypothesis 
indicates that alternative models warrant further exploration.  
Although there is limited research on the interplay of these biases, Everaert, 
Koster, & Derakshan (2012) suggested that these biases may interact with one another to 
predict depression symptoms. More specifically, they propose conditional effects (i.e. 
moderation effects) of each processing bias on depression symptoms in that select 
processing biases in isolation may not have significant impact on depression, but when 
these biases act in concert, they may activate depressed mood. Recent research evaluating 
these biases in a sample with depression symptoms suggest that biases in attention, 
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interpretation, and memory may influence one another. Everaert, Tierens, Uzieblo, & 
Koster (2013), found that negative interpretation bias mediated the relationship between 
attention biases for negative stimuli and enhanced memory recall for negative 
information. In essence, enhanced recall for negative information was partially accounted 
for by the negative interpretations of stimuli as opposed to purely the attentional capture 
of negative information. Related, Tran, Hertel, & Joormann (2011) found that training for 
positive or negative interpretation biases for ambiguous scenarios influences memory 
recall depending upon the training condition (i.e., positive or negative interpretation). 
Taken together, these findings suggest that negative interpretation biases influence 
attention and memory biases, indicating that remedying interpretation biases via 
therapeutic interventions may be particularly important to reducing future risk of 
depressive episodes.  
Although the common processing bias model and the condition model were not 
supported by the current study, the results show that interpretation biases may be the 
active ingredient in the depressogenic process. More specifically, it may not be the 
attention of negative stimuli that leads to increased recall of negative information, but 
instead the emotional encoding associated as a function of this interpretation that leads to 
enhanced recall of negative information and maintenance of depressed mood (Patel, 
Brewin, Wheatley, Wells, Fisher, & Myers, 2007). Previous research has suggested that 
emotional arousal facilitates the encoding and recall of emotionally valenced information, 
and given the present findings, it is proposed that the active mechanism between in this 
process is interpretation (Bradley, Greenwald, Petry, & Lang, 1992; Cahill & McGaugh, 
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1998; Lothmann et al. 2011). While the present research is limited in the ability to test 
this hypothesis, future research should explore manipulating interpretation biases in 
either positive or negative valences to evaluate changes in attention and memory biases 
as a function of this manipulation. Given the previous findings that interpretation biases 
are malleable, this avenue of research would have significant implications for the 
understanding of the association between both memory and attentional biases and 
recovery from depression (Salemink, Hertel, & Mackintosh, 2010).  
Limitations 
Several limitations to the current study should be noted. The present study is 
limited in regard to the causal associations between depression and processing biases as 
biases were captured following depressive episodes, which limit the ability to determine 
if these biases were present before the depressive episode or if biases are the 
psychological scars in the wake of depression (Lewinsohn, Steinmetz, Larson, & 
Franklin, 1981). Relatedly, while the remitted depressed sample did not indicate 
depressive episodes over the past eight weeks, it was evident from self-report measures 
that the remitted depressed group reported mild, ongoing depression symptoms as based 
on the PHQ-9. While the two groups did not significantly differ in self-reported 
depression symptoms, the remitted depressed group showed increased anhedonia 
symptoms in comparison to the never depressed group. It may be that the observed 
differences in interpretation bias is related to ongoing anhedonia and may not have been 
due to an underlying processing bias as proposed. As such, interpretation biases may be 
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indicative of subsyndromal symptoms of depression as opposed to a full “recovery” from 
depression.  
Additionally, another limitation includes the low number of men in this sample. 
While the gender distribution was consistent with undergraduate samples, it may limit the 
generalizability to men. Given the research on gender differences in regard to risk for 
depression (Nolen-Hoeksema & Hilt, 2009), it may not be appropriate to make 
generalizations to both men and women regarding these results. However, future research 
should explore gender differences between processing biases and other vulnerability 
mechanisms that underlie depression (e.g. interpretation biases interacting with 
rumination).  
Implications for the Understanding and Treatment of Depression 
In line with previous research, the present study suggests that interpretation biases 
are elevated in individuals with a lifetime history of depression. Contrary to previous 
research, interpretation biases were present in comparison to never depressed individuals 
in conditions with and without cognitive demands. This may suggest that these biases are 
not suppressed or masked as previously thought. In addition, it is plausible that these 
biases act as “psychological scars” in the wake of depressive episodes. However, the 
observed differences in interpretation bias is particularly poignant given the evidence that 
interpretation biases may be one of the active ingredients in contributing to depression 
recurrence (Rude et al., 2002).  
CBM research has provided recent evidence that changes in interpretation biases 
has significant implications for mood repair. Mackintosh, Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway, & 
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Cook (2006) found that interpretation training for both positive and negative content has 
significant implications for stress reactivity. The researchers found evidence for shifts in 
mood as a function of induced bias in that positively trained individuals demonstrated 
decreased emotional distress following a distressing video in comparison to negatively 
trained individuals. Furthermore, a recent study by Joormann, Waugh, & Gotlib, (2015) 
found that following CBM for interpretations, individuals with MDD demonstrated 
decreased stress reactivity in response to laboratory induced stress induction. 
Additionally, the extant literature suggests that CBM for interpretations leads to change 
in interpretations, but that changes in interpretations are associated with improved mood 
and protective against the recurrence of negative mood (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; 
Lang, Moulds, & Holmes, 2009; Lothmann, Holmes, Chan, Lau, 2011). Taken together, 
these findings suggest interpretation may play a critical role in reactivity to stress and 
management of negative affect.  
The literature supporting the persistence and the positive benefits of manipulation 
of interpretation biases has significant implications for the exploration of the associations 
amongst processing biases. Recent findings in the CBM literature have found that 
changes in interpretations can influence both memory and attention bias. For example, 
Tran, Hertel, & Joormann (2011) provide evidence that positive interpretation training 
leads to not only change in interpretation, but also leads to enhanced recall of positive 
information. Similarly, Joormann, Waugh, & Gotlib, (2015) found that following CBM 
for interpretation biases, individuals with MDD demonstrated not only more positive 
interpretations, but also more positive intrusive memories as a function of changes in 
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interpretations. Additionally, CBM trials have shown that positive interpretation training 
can lead to shifts in attentional control. Bowler, Mackintosh, Dunn, Mathews, Dalgleish, 
& Hoppitt (2012) provide evidence that following a two-week cognitive bias 
modification for interpretations intervention, individuals with social anxiety 
demonstrated decreases in interpretation biases as well as self-reported increases in 
attentional control and decreases in depression symptoms. Furthermore, a recent meta-
analysis of CBM interventions suggests that interpretation training has a larger impact on 
biases than attention training, further indicating the importance of interpretation training 
as a mechanism for change (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). Taken together, these findings 
suggest that interpretation bias changes may be the key ingredient in the combined 
cognitive bias hypothesis as the persistence of these biases demonstrate strongest 
relationship with depression recurrence as well as changes in attentional control, memory 
and stress reactivity. 
Future Research Directions 
 While the current study provides limited evidence for the support of the combined 
cognitive bias hypothesis following the remission of depression, the present findings give 
rise to future research avenues. First, it may be beneficial to test for processing biases 
using similar experimental tasks; however, in order to maximize the observed effects, it is 
possible that these biases may need to be “activated” by a negative mood induction to be 
adequately observed. Secondly, consistent with the cognitive model of depression, it may 
be of interest to evaluate the interaction of these processing biases with life stress to 
determine the causal links between these biases and depression recurrence. Additionally, 
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future research should evaluate these biases at earlier stages in development such as early 
adolescence, to be able to make more causal statements regarding the development of 
processing biases and how they relate to depression symptoms. Such longitudinal studies 
may also be able to address the stability of processing biases over time to determine the 
association between mood, life stress, and processing biases.  
Conclusions 
 In conclusion, the present study provides limited evidence for the support of the 
combined cognitive bias hypothesis. The results suggest no differences in attentional and 
memory biases between the remitted depressed and never depressed samples. However, 
in regard to interpretation biases, individuals with remitted depression demonstrated an 
enhanced negative interpretation bias in comparison to never depressed individuals. 
Additionally, the existence of an underlying common processing bias was not supported 
by the data, suggesting that biases across attention, memory, and interpretation are not 
due to shared process. While findings were not in support of the combined cognitive bias 
hypothesis, the present data further highlights the significance of interpretation biases 
following depression remission. In particular, the present study indicates that 
interpretation biases may play a particularly crucial role in the recurrence of depression 
symptoms, and therefore may have important implications for future research into the 
cause and treatment of depression. 
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